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ABSTRACT
Objectives To explore the history of transnational
tobacco companies’ use of the term, approach to and
perceived beneﬁts of ‘harm reduction’.
Methods Analysis of internal tobacco industry
documents, contemporary tobacco industry literature and
6 semistructured interviews.
Results The 2001 Institute of Medicine report on
tobacco harm reduction appears to have been pivotal in
shaping industry discourse. Documents suggest British
American Tobacco and Philip Morris International
adopted the term ‘harm reduction’ from Institute of
Medicine, then proceeded to heavily emphasise the term
in their corporate messaging. Documents and interviews
suggest harm reduction offered the tobacco industry two
main beneﬁts: an opportunity to (re-) establish dialogue
with and access to policy makers, scientists and public
health groups and to secure reputational beneﬁts via an
emerging corporate social responsibility agenda.
Conclusions Transnational tobacco companies’ harm
reduction discourse should be seen as opportunistic
tactical adaptation to policy change rather than a
genuine commitment to harm reduction. Care should be
taken that this does not undermine gains hitherto
secured in efforts to reduce the ability of the tobacco
industry to inappropriately inﬂuence policy.
INTRODUCTION
In a 2005 speech at the National Press Club in
Australia, David Davies, then Philip Morris
International’s (PMI) Senior Vice-president
Corporate Affairs, suggested PMI shared signiﬁcant
common ground with the public health community,
and that his company could be ‘a positive contribu-
tor, indeed a partner in shaping future policy for
tobacco’ (authors’ emphasis).1 Davies was referring
to the concept of ‘tobacco harm reduction’, a term
that has increasingly entered the tobacco industry’s
vernacular. For example, in 2008 British American
Tobacco (BAT) set up a special website (http://www.
bat-science.com) promoting their research and
development (R&D) efforts in developing poten-
tially reduced harm tobacco products. David
O’Reilly, BAT’s Scientiﬁc Director, states on this
website that he believes that ‘tobacco harm reduc-
tion has the potential to be one of the biggest
public health opportunities of this generation’
(accessed March 2013).2 Similarly, other BAT
employees have begun publicly commenting on
academic papers addressing harm reduction issues,
offering ‘to work with the public health community
and regulators to achieve a reduction in the public
health impact of tobacco use’.3 4
The public health community has been divided
over the possible beneﬁts of tobacco harm reduc-
tion, with the debate in Europe focused hitherto on
a low risk smokeless tobacco (SLT) product, snus,5
and more recently on e-cigarettes.6 Public health
interest in snus began following observations of the
so-called ‘Swedish Experience’, which attributes
Sweden’s low male smoking prevalence, and result-
ing low levels of tobacco-related mortality, to high
rates of snus use among Swedish men.7–9 With
overwhelming evidence that snus is considerably
less harmful than smoking, and that nicotine addic-
tion is the key reason why smokers continue to
smoke, this raises the potential for lives to be saved
if smokers could switch from cigarettes to using
nicotine in a less hazardous form such as snus.10
While an Australian modelling study suggests
that the introduction of snus should reduce harm at
a population level,11 others argue that the extent to
which this may occur will depend on how snus is
marketed, who takes it up, and whether it success-
fully enables smokers to quit cigarettes.12 13
Concerns focus mainly on the possibility that mar-
keting of snus may lead to an increase in dual
tobacco use rather than a decrease in cigarette
smoking or to snus acting as a gateway into tobacco
use for non-smokers.
In the European Union (EU), with the exception
of Sweden, the sale of snus has been prohibited
since 1992.14 Despite this ban, the four trans-
national tobacco companies (TTCs) operating on
the European tobacco market (BAT, PMI, Imperial
Tobacco (IMT) and Japan Tobacco International
( JTI)) have been acquiring, or entering into joint
ventures with, Swedish snus manufacturers, to the
extent that small independent manufacturers only
account for an insigniﬁcant proportion of the
Scandinavian snus market (the only snus market in
Europe).15 16 Concurrently, TTCs have started pub-
licly opposing this ban on snus sales, supporting
their position with a harm reduction narrative.17–19
Yet recent research shows this narrative is inconsist-
ent with the TTCs’ private documentation which
suggests that harm reduction is not central to their
business strategy.16 In addition, evidence from the
USA, an established SLT market, suggests that snus
is being marketed to augment cigarette use.20–23
This paper seeks to examine TTCs’ use of the
term ‘harm reduction’. It examines when and why
harm reduction ﬁrst entered TTC’s discourse, and
explores the TTCs’ approach to and perceived ben-
eﬁts of harm reduction. In so doing it aims to
assess whether the tobacco industry’s interest in
harm reduction reﬂects opportunistic tactical
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adaptation to policy change, or a substantive commitment to
harm reduction.
METHODS
Our study was based on internal tobacco company documents,
available on the online Legacy Tobacco Documents Library
(http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/) following litigation in the USA.24
The Legacy Library was searched between May 2010 and
February 2013, with searches focused on the two largest TTCs,
PMI and BAT. PMI has been through various restructures, with
its current form established in 2008 when it spun off from
Altria (known pre-2003 as Philip Morris Companies).15 For
simplicity purposes, we refer to ‘PMI’ throughout this paper.
Documents were initially retrieved using broad search terms
(eg,‘harm reduction’, ‘smokeless tobacco’, ‘R&D strategy’). The
documents retrieved helped identify secondary search terms
including relevant internal committees (eg, BAT’s Tobacco
Executive Committee and BAT’s Research Policy Group) and
key personnel. Surrounding Bates numbers of key documents
were also searched. The iterative process of searching, analysing
and reﬁning resulted in a ﬁnal set of 455 documents, dating
from 1971 to 2009. Analysis of these documents was based on
a hermeneutical approach to company document analysis,25
complemented by sociohistorical archival techniques.26
To validate and update this documentary evidence, and specif-
ically to explore when and how tobacco industry discourse on
harm reduction was introduced and changed, we triangulated
the documentary evidence obtained with data from other
tobacco industry sources. First, we searched the TTCs’ corporate
websites (http://www.bat.com, http://www.pmi.com, http://www.
jti.com, http://www.imperial-tobacco.com) to identify their pos-
ition on harm reduction. Second we searched TTCs’ annual
reports for the terms ‘harm reduction’, ‘reduced harm’, ‘smoke-
less’ and ‘snus’, recording all occurrences. This analysis was
undertaken on all reports accessible online, via the British
Library and personal contacts in October 2012: 1997–2011
annual reports for BAT (minus the 1998 report); 1997–2011
annual reports for IMT; 2005–2012 annual reports for JTI; and
2002–2011 annual reports for PMI.
As our document and website searches identiﬁed BAT as par-
ticularly vocal on harm reduction we further explored BAT’s
use of the term harm reduction. We searched BAT’s sustainabil-
ity reports from 2001/2002 (the ﬁrst year of publication) to
2011 (prior to 2007 these were referred to as social reports)
using the same search terms as used for the annual report
searches. In October 2012 and March 2013 we accessed the
Internet Archive Wayback Machine (http://www.archive.org), a
historic archive of preserved webpages based on web crawler
technology, which allows archived versions of websites to be
visited. We entered BAT’s URL (http://www.bat.com) into the
Wayback Machine, selecting the earliest web page that was
returned in the results (29 October 1996) and searched this
page for BAT communications on harm reduction and SLT
(note: the search revealed that BAT has only owned this URL
from 2000, with an unrelated company owning the URL from
1996–2000). Relevant content and observations were systemat-
ically recorded. We repeated this process for all archived BAT
webpages up to the last entry in 2012 (dated 23 December).
Finally, between November 2010 and January 2011 we
undertook six semistructured interviews with seven key infor-
mants including three Swedish public health experts and four
senior tobacco industry representatives from the European
Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC), BAT and Swedish Match
(Europe’s biggest SLT manufacturer). JTI, PMI and IMT were
also invited for interview, but either declined or did not
respond to our invitation. We deliberately approached Swedish
public health experts because of the legal status of snus sales in
Sweden. Interviews were professionally transcribed and analysed
using a framework approach where emerging data were coded
using a thematic structure which drew on themes identiﬁed
from the existing literature while also allowing for new themes
to emerge from the analysis itself.27
RESULTS
Emergence of the TTCs’ discourse on harm reduction
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, ‘Clearing the Smoke’ and the
emergence of the tobacco industry’s harm reduction discourse
TTCs only began using the term ‘harm reduction’ from 1999
onwards and consistently from 2000.28–33 This coincided with
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) commissioning the
IOM to study the feasibility of tobacco harm reduction.34
Documentary, interview and other tobacco industry material
ﬁndings suggest that this study, which took place over 1999–
2001 and resulted in the ‘Clearing the Smoke’ report,35 was a
turning point in the tobacco industry’s approach to, and dia-
logue on harm reduction. In February 2000, the IOM invited
US-based tobacco manufacturers to meet with its Working
Group to discuss ‘the lessons learned by the tobacco industry
from previous attempts at developing products for harm reduc-
tion’.36 This approach was welcomed by the tobacco indus-
try,37–39 and it is around this time that the term ‘harm
reduction’ gradually, but consistently, appears in the internal
tobacco industry’s documents.29 40–48 Prior to 1999 no
retrieved BAT or PMI documents mention the term ‘harm
reduction’. Instead they refer to a variety of terms including
‘reduced risk’,49 50 ‘smoking and health’,51 ‘risk minimiza-
tion’,52 or ‘reduction of noxae’,53 which appear to reﬂect the
research focus at the time on developing a ‘safer’ cigarette.54–56
Use of harm reduction in TTC public documentation
Our analysis of TTCs’ annual reports and BAT’s social reports
and website also suggests that ‘harm reduction’ only began to be
used in TTC public documentation from 2002 onwards, its use
increasing steadily thereafter albeit more by some TTCs than
others (tables 1–3). BAT’s ﬁrst social report (2001/2002) is the
ﬁrst public report in which we identify any TTC mentioning
‘harm reduction’ (table 2).57 The fact that this report was pub-
lished in 2002 limits our ability to assess whether BAT previ-
ously used this term, but the ﬁnding that its annual reports did
not mention harm reduction until 2004 (table 1) make this
unlikely. Similarly, analysis of BAT’s website (http://www.bat.
com) suggests that BAT started referring to ‘less harmful’
tobacco products on its website in 2005, simultaneously
announcing the expansion of its product portfolio with snus
(table 3).
TTC approach to and perceived beneﬁts of harm reduction
Dialogue with, and access to, scientists, public health community
and policy makers
Shortly after the IOM initiated its study, BAT commissioned
consultancy ﬁrm, The Lewin Group to establish a public engage-
ment schedule to support the development of a ‘Harm
Reduction Strategy’.58 The Lewin Group’s proposal suggested
that dialogue take place with health professionals and policy
makers to explore how they might ﬁnd harm reduction accept-
able, followed by a ‘public forum’ with smokers aiming to
‘stimulate public debate, raise issues relating to harm reduction
for committed smokers and provide a platform for further
Research paper
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public relations’ (authors’ emphasis).58 It is unclear whether
BAT followed through on The Lewin Group’s proposal,
although in November 2000 BAT organised a risk assessment
workshop for academics in the UK59–61 to discuss ‘‘Tobacco
Harm Reduction’ Assessment Criteria’.62 Six BAT scientists and
nine external scientists attended,63–65 including toxicologist Jim
Bridges who chaired the workshop on BAT’s behalf.61 65–67
Documents show that BAT attempted to include the UK
Department of Health (DH) in this event, but that the DH
declined.60 68
Subsequently, ‘The strategy of using the IOM report as a cata-
lyst for further dialogue with UK scientiﬁc stakeholders’ was dis-
cussed at an April 2001 BAT operational planning meeting.69 In
an interview, the BAT representative also stressed the importance
of dialogue with the public health community, stating that the
tobacco industry and public health community have previously
worked in silos, whereas dialogue would enable BAT to deter-
mine what, and how much, harm reduction science it should be
doing, and would enable public health to better understand
smokers and their needs (interview December 2010).
Signiﬁcantly, BAT and ESTOC interviewees attribute BAT’s deci-
sion to add snus to its portfolio, and brand snus with existing
cigarette brands like Lucky Strike (an issue which appears to be
controversial within industry, see box 1) to dialogue with, and
encouragement from, UK public health experts70 (interviews 25
November and 9 December 2010).
TTCs’ use of harm reduction to signal alignment of tobacco
industry interests with public health is also apparent in contem-
porary corporate materials. Public health experts’ views on the
beneﬁts of harm reduction are cited on BAT’s and PMI’s web-
sites,73 74 and when BAT ﬁrst integrated a section on harm
reduction on its website it stated that BAT would continue ‘to
seek common ground on harm reduction with health policy-
makers, who are looking to achieve a reduction in the net
public health impact of tobacco use’ (archived version http://
www.bat.com 9 August 2007, Harm Reduction section, accessed
13 March 2013). PMI’s 2008 annual report states that it sup-
ports regulations that ‘are aligned with the public health object-
ive of reducing harm caused by tobacco products’ (yet noting
that it won’t ‘support every proposal made by public health
groups’).75
Similarly, TTCs’ websites76–78 and BATcompany reports57 79–81
underline a role for harm reduction in establishing dialogue with
and access to policy makers. BAT suggests in its ﬁrst Social Report
published in 2002 that the tobacco industry and governments
‘work together as partners, rather than adversaries’.57 In 2009
BAT’s website reported that BAT had contacted the FDA (which
had just been given the authority to regulate tobacco products
in the USA) to share information about BAT’s proposed harm
reduction framework and ‘aid regulators in assessing any such
(potentially reduced harm) new products’ (archived version http://
www.bat.com 30 September 2009, Harm Reduction section,
accessed 13March 2013).
TTCs’ use of harm reduction to gain access to policy makers
was also reﬂected in the internal documents. For example, in
July 2000 BAT arranged a meeting with DH ofﬁcials to discuss
risk communication and ‘safer’ cigarettes.82 Afterwards BAT
noted there was an appetite among government ofﬁcials to
‘reach consensus’ on the harm reduction issue, and that harm
reduction could be used to establish ongoing access to, and dia-
logue with, senior government ofﬁcials.82 Likewise, documents
suggest that in 2000 PMI had had dialogue on reduced harm
product development with IOM, Health Canada, the EU
Commission, World Health Organization (WHO), among
others,83 and had approached the DH to set up a meeting ‘to
share further information’ on reduced harm products.84–86 On
12 November 2001 DH representatives visited PMI’s R&D
facility in Germany, INBIFO.87 Whereas, in the 1970s and
1980s, PMI had attempted to ensure its ownership of INBIFO
was kept secret (a time when the tobacco industry was still
claiming that evidence of the toxic effects of smoking was
inconclusive),87 PMI now welcomed government ofﬁcials to this
facility to discuss its harm reduction programme.43 88–90
Signiﬁcantly, documents suggest this study trip was initiated by
the DH.90–92
That policy makers remain a key target of the TTCs’ harm
reduction discourse was conﬁrmed by the BAT interviewee who
noted that BATwas trying to engage with governments on harm
reduction (interview December 2010). Despite BAT’s efforts to
engage in dialogue with DH on harm reduction in 2009 and
2010 (the latter after a new government came into power subse-
quently entering into ‘responsibility deals’ with the food and
alcohol industries93), efforts had been unsuccessful (interview
December 2010).
Responsibility and ‘Improvement of credibility’
Simultaneous with the public health community’s emergent
interest in tobacco harm reduction,42 TTC’s corporate social
responsibility (CSR) agenda (initiated by PMI and BAT in
199793–95) was increasing in prominence and our ﬁndings
suggest they were mutually reinforcing. Existing research shows
the CSR agenda emerged once evidence from US lawsuits began
to seriously damage the tobacco industry’s reputation, ending its
insider status with governments and,96 its golden era, dominated
by voluntary agreements between government and an industry
that ‘could be relied on to act responsibly’.16 97 To regain the
policy inﬂuence TTCs had previously enjoyed, BAT recognised
the importance of rebuilding its reputation.93
Table 1 References to ‘harm reduction’ or ‘reduced harm’ and
‘smokeless tobacco’ or ‘snus’ in TTCs annual reporting
BAT* IMT JTI† PMI
Year HR SLT HR SLT HR SLT HR SLT
1997 0 0 0 0 – – – –
1998 – – 0 0 – – – –
1999 0 0 0 0 – – – –
2000 0 0 0 0 – – – –
2001 0 0 0 0 – – – –
2002 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 – – 0 0
2004 5 0 0 0 – – 1 0
2005 9 29 0 9 0 0 0 0
2006 12 9 0 8 0 0 0 2
2007 11 14 0 6 0 1 0 7
2008 6 47 0 6 0 0 3 1
2009 7 15 0 14 0 0 3 2
2010 13 47 0 13 0 16 1 1
2011 9 5 0 12 0 9 0 1
2012 – – 0 9 0 8 – –
*BAT's 1998 annual report is unavailable.
†Results are based on JTI’s annual reports, which also include reporting on JTI's
domestic tobacco market and its pharmaceutical and food business. Earlier copies are
were not available on JTI's website, or in the British Library.
BAT, British American Tobacco; HR, ‘harm reduction’ or ‘reduced harm’; IMT, Imperial
Tobacco; JTI, Japan Tobacco International; PMI, Philip Morris International; SLT,
‘smokeless tobacco’ or ’snus’; TTCs, transnational tobacco companies.
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Shortly after the IOM invited the tobacco industry to engage
on harm reduction, BAT’s Adrian Marshall (who had established
BAT’s CSR programme in 199998) identiﬁed harm reduction as
one of six key ‘reputation management initiatives’99 that would
help BAT rebuild its reputation as a responsible company.39
Shortly afterwards, BAT’s scientist, Eian Massey, highlighted the
reputational opportunities the IOM study created, recommend-
ing that its US subsidiary should ‘address the agenda of us being
a responsible Company’40 in its correspondence with IOM.
Previous research shows that BAT considered harm reduction a
preferred CSR initiative because it was politically salient, was
unlikely to be seen as undermining other tobacco control pol-
icies, and dialogue on the issue could be represented as ‘the
morally right thing to do’.93
Like BAT, PMI also considered harm reduction an opportun-
ity to rebuild corporate legitimacy. Handwritten comments on
the agenda of a September 2000 PMI meeting in Hong Kong to
brief staff on PMI’s research strategy, noted that ‘improvement
of credibility’ was to be the overall result of PMI’s harm reduc-
tion efforts.42 Similarly, an April 2001 draft statement of CSR
principles declared that PMI ‘will focus our efforts on harm
reduction as it applies to our product, and to or policies, pro-
grammes and positions’100 and PMI staff surveys in 2002 identi-
ﬁed harm reduction as central to corporate reputation.101
That harm reduction became important to TTCs’ CSR strat-
egies, was conﬁrmed by the BAT interviewee who reported that
BAT’s early stakeholder dialogue events, initiated in 2001 as
part of its emergent CSR programme,94 made BAT understand
the importance of doing, and being seen to do, reduced harm
research (interview December 2010). BAT’s subsequent social
reports57 appear to have addressed this concern; mentions of
harm reduction increasing over time to become a key focus of
these reports (table 2). BAT’s website was also established in
2000 ostensibly as part of BAT‘s emerging CSR strategy given
that the website’s purpose was ‘to explain more about what we
do and what we believe in’,102 including highlighting that BAT
was involved in ‘product modiﬁcation research’ to address
health concerns (table 3). By drawing attention to their attempts
to reduce the risk of smoking, TTCs positioned themselves as
partners rather than adversaries in achieving public health
gains.57 In its 2010 Sustainability Report, BAT remarked that
‘stakeholders who do talk with us often seem surprised by our
candour and willingness to listen. Some are people and groups
who would not have engaged with us a few years ago’.103
DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates that TTCs’ adoption and subsequent
use of the term harm reduction occurred in direct response to
the public health agenda (which TTCs had been monitoring
closely). The ‘Clearing the Smoke’ study by IOM appears to
have been pivotal in shaping the tobacco industry discourse on
harm reduction. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that harm reduction
serves TTC interests in two main, mutually reinforcing, ways.
First TTCs use harm reduction to facilitate access to, and
Table 2 Number of references to ‘harm reduction’ or ‘reduced harm’ and ‘smokeless tobacco’ or ‘snus’ in BAT’s social reports from 2001/2002
to 2011 (name changed to ‘sustainability reports’ from 2007 thereafter)
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
HR 2 2 3 54 72 16 41 41 100 247 232
SLT 0 2 0 29 117 5 38 48 52 35 19
BAT, British American Tobacco; HR, ‘harm reduction’ or ‘reduced harm’; SLT, smokeless tobacco.
Table 3 Timeline of BAT harm reduction discourse on BAT’s corporate website (http://www.bat.com), based on archived webpages (dating from
1996–2012) available from http://www.archive.org
Date Emergence and key changes to harm reduction and snus rhetoric
1996–2000 ▸ Website owned by an unrelated non-tobacco company
May 2000 ▸ BAT set up website to ‘help you know us (BAT) a little better, and to balance the debate on issues that can be controversial’.
▸ Drop down main menu directs to BAT’s views on smoking, marketing, corporate citizenship, environment, health and safety, and people.
▸ Claims that smoking as a cause of certain diseases is the ‘working hypothesis of much of our product modification research’.
May 2005 ▸ Press release on BAT’s snus investments added, saying it aims to give ‘smokers the chance to enjoy a less harmful form of tobacco’
▸ BAT also states it supports the lifting of the EU ban on snus sales, pointing at the ‘significantly lower health risks’ and arguing that marketing
should be aimed only ‘at adults who have chosen to consume tobacco’
Aug 2007 ▸ Significant website restructure, with new main section on ‘health and science’. First time that ‘harm reduction’ and ‘smokeless tobacco and
health’ are dedicated subcategories.
▸ BAT claims its investment in snus is ‘in line with our [BAT’s] continuing efforts in harm reduction and a response to those public health
stakeholders who told us they believe that snus, properly regulated, can contribute to reducing the health impact of tobacco use’.
March 2008 ▸ Harm reduction is now referred to as ‘a key element of our [BAT’s] business strategy’.
▸ BAT’s new website, bat-science.com, is promoted (‘written by scientists for scientists’), with a new external link to the IOM report added.
Oct 2010 ▸ BAT adds video ‘The Science of Harm Reduction’ to its website.
April 2011 ▸ BAT announces its establishment of Nicoventures, a stand-alone company which will focus on nicotine-only products, calling it ‘a natural
extension’ of their ‘approach to tobacco harm reduction that has been developed over years’.
June 2011 ▸ BAT indicates it no longer runs snus test markets in South Africa, Canada and Japan, and only sells snus in Sweden and Norway.
March 2012 ▸ The ‘smokeless tobacco and health’ section has been moved away from the core part of the Health and Science part, to a drop-down menu on
the left margin.
Dec 2012 ▸ BAT announces it has acquired an e-cigarette company and claims, as with Nicoventures, it’s a natural extension of their approach to harm
reduction.
BAT, British American Tobacco; IOM, Institute of Medicine.
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dialogue with scientists, public health experts and policy
makers, presenting themselves as ‘partners, rather than adversar-
ies’57 who share a common goal. Second, TTCs considered
harm reduction a ‘reputation management initiative’,99 facilitat-
ing the tobacco industry’s image rehabilitation as a ‘responsible
business’. From the beginning, harm reduction was intimately
linked to BAT’s and PMI’s emerging CSR strategies, providing a
means of increasing corporate credibility with stakeholders;
with social reports and corporate websites used to communicate
this message.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with previous research showing
that the TTCs saw HR as a means of improving their corporate
reputation to regain access to regulators and, with that, inﬂu-
ence over tobacco control policy.93 96 Both support our earlier
work16 which also challenges TTCs’ purported commitment to
harm reduction by demonstrating that TTCs’ interest and invest-
ments in SLT in Europe were defensive and originated from a
desire to generate new tobacco sales ‘without cannibalising exist-
ing proﬁts from cigarettes’,104 rather than a desire to reduce
harm from tobacco. This paper details how TTCs intended to
harness those opportunities and suggests that TTCs’ harm
reduction discourse should be seen as opportunistic tactical
adaptation to policy change rather than a genuine commitment
to harm reduction. While our analysis strongly suggests that
BAT’s and PMI’s main interests in harm reduction were access
and reputation, we cannot rule out the possibility of a genuine
commitment to harm reduction. We note, however, that there
was very little evidence of this relative to the evidence of reputa-
tional and access beneﬁts.
A further ﬁnding of interest is the difference between tobacco
companies in their approach to snus branding. The cigarette
manufacturers have branded some of their snus with cigarette
brands (according to BAT in response to public health advice),
while Swedish Match, which no longer has any cigarette inter-
ests, cites market research that snus users (including ex-smokers)
prefer snus brands. Both Swedish Match and ESTOC appear to
contest whether the cigarette branded snus produced by cigar-
ette manufacturers can contribute to harm reduction. To our
knowledge there are no published data on this. This highlights
the complexity and the lack of detailed knowledge about the
potential for snus as a harm reduction product.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. The nature of tobacco indus-
try document research means that we made decisions about
which search terms and documents were most relevant.
Inadvertently, this may have resulted in some relevant docu-
ments not having been included in the analysis. Furthermore,
the archives comprise only those documents obtained through
the discovery process in litigation. Documents may have been
innocently omitted, intentionally destroyed or omitted, or
inappropriately classiﬁed as privileged. To overcome these lim-
itations we were as comprehensive as possible in our searching
and reached a point of document saturation, where new
searches led to documents already retrieved; an indicator that
most important documents have been identiﬁed. We also used
contemporary materials and interviews to triangulate our ﬁnd-
ings and overcome the issue that most retrieved documents
predate 2002. The document collections do not include docu-
ments from IMT, JTI or Swedish Match; these companies may
take a different approach to harm reduction than BAT and PMI
(eg see box 1).
Using the Wayback Machine (archive.org) has its limitations
as it is based on crawler technology which only indexes a frac-
tion of the available content. Thus, the archived pages of BAT’s
website do not necessarily reﬂect the entire content of BAT’s
website at a given time. Rather, the archived website versions
give a broad indication of which year BAT introduced communi-
cations on harm reduction and SLT.
Policy implications
Our analysis suggests that TTCs’ harm reduction discourse
should be seen as an opportunistic tactical adaptation to policy
change, and shows that TTCs, in the past and present, have
tried to use harm reduction discourse to access public health
policy makers. Care must be taken that the harm reduction
debate does not allow TTCs to re-enter the policy arena from
which they have increasingly been excluded in line with Article
5.3 of WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
which aims to protect public health from the commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry.105
We note that various meetings discussing harm reduction,
including public health conferences in the UK and FDA policy
forums in the USA,106 107 have included tobacco industry repre-
sentatives. In part this is because of blurring of the deﬁnition
‘tobacco industry’ given TTCs’ recent investments in pure nico-
tine and e-cigarettes. Our ﬁndings however suggest that this will
merely serve to ‘re-normalize’ an industry that is determined to
be seen as a responsible business with a legitimate product,
exactly as, this paper shows, industry intended.
Box 1 Tobacco companies’ perspectives on snus
branding.
The issue of cigarette branded snus appears to be debated
within the tobacco industry. The Swedish Match interviewees
noted that their market research indicates that full time snus
consumers (including ex-smokers) do not want snus linked to
cigarettes or smoking, and expressed discomfort about cigarette
branded snus (interview January 2011). Similarly, the European
Smokeless Tobacco Council interviewee claimed that cigarette
branded snus had not succeeded in the Swedish market, and
suggested that non-cigarette branded snus was better able to
communicate a reduced risk message (interview November
2010). The BAT interviewee on the other hand reported that its
decision to brand snus with a cigarette brand (ie, Lucky Strike
and Peter Stuyvesant) had been based on advice from UK public
health experts, who had argued that if BAT were to be serious
about switching smokers from cigarettes to snus, they should
put their biggest cigarette brand on it (interview, December
2010). Interestingly, Euromonitor 2009 sales data indicate that
cigarette branded snus represented only 2% market share in
Sweden,71 and 3.6% in Norway,72 with BAT’s traditional snus
brands (Granit and Mocca) showing slightly bigger growth than
its Lucky Strike and Camel Snus.
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What this paper adds
▸ The ‘Clearing the Smoke’ study by the Institute of Medicine
has been pivotal in shaping tobacco industry discourse on
harm reduction. Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs)
adopted the term ‘harm reduction’ in response to this study,
and proceeded to heavily emphasise the term in corporate
messaging.
▸ Apart from trying to make a safer cigarette, documents
show that TTCs’ use of harm reduction was aimed to gain
access to scientists, the public health community and policy
makers, and rebuild its reputation as a responsible industry.
▸ Although we can’t rule out the possibility of a genuine
commitment to harm reduction, this study suggests that
TTCs’ harm reduction discourse should be approached
critically and seen as opportunistic tactical adaptation to
policy change.
▸ This study underlines the importance of ensuring that the
harm reduction debate does not allow TTCs to re-enter the
policy area from which they have increasingly been excluded
in line with Article 5.3 of WHO’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control.
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